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DOG-SNIFF SEARCHES IN MASSACHUSETTS
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: HOW CLOSE IS TOO CLOSE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Many Massachusetts school districts are plagued by a perpetual
and increasing trend of student drug use and inter-school violence.1 Still
other school districts that have not yet encountered such issues are well
aware of the potentially devastating consequences that may result if preventative measures are not taken. 2 Consequently, many school districts
have chosen to employ contraband-sniffing dogs in an attempt to reduce
these unsettling problems and to prevent tragedy from occurring. 3 The actual and proposed use of police-trained narcotic-sniffing dogs in some
Massachusetts schools, however, has conjured images of vicious dogs4
"nipping" at innocent children's heels as they sit in their classrooms.

Massachusetts has a duty to prevent these mental images from becoming a
5
reality as they have in other states' school districts.

1 Tracy Jan, Spike in Violence in Middle Schools Raises Concern, THE BOSTON GLOBE, October 2, 2007, at AI (discussing state-wide concern for increasing levels of violence and drug use
in schools). According to the article, Massachusetts suburban and rural middle schools in 200506 had 4,750 reports of violence, including fights, sexual assaults, robberies, and threats of violence; 484 drug, alcohol, and tobacco offenses; 290 cases of sexual harassment, and 383 weapons
found. Id.
2 See Suicide Brings Attention to Teen Prescription Drug Use, Feb. 3, 2006,
http://www.jointogether.org/newslheadlineslinthenews/2006/suicide-brings-attention-to.html
(last
visited March 3, 2008) (describing Arlington school district's consideration of employment of
drug-sniffing dogs in wake of student's suicide); see also Lauren DeFilippo, Scent and Sensibility,
Wicked
Local:
East
Bridgewater,
February
6,
2008,
http://www.wickedlocal.com/bridgewatereast/news/x254763421
(reporting East Bridgewater
School District's plan to employ drug sniffing dogs to search school by end of 2008 school year).
DeFilippo's article notes that East Bridgewater school principal, Paul Vieira, stated that the contemplated dog-sniff searches were meant to be a "proactive, rather than a reactive approach to
school safety." Id.
3 DeFilippo, supra note 2 (discussing use of dog-sniff searches in West Bridgewater, Carver,
Bridgewater-Raynham, Scituate, Rockland, and Abington school districts).
4 Regional High School Considers Dog Search Policy, MARTHA'S VINEYARD TIMES, Jan.
11, 2007, at 2. The article quoted the principal who explained that, "dogs do not sniff students,
but rather their book bags, lockers, and cars. Students are cleared from a classroom before it is
searched. 'The whole image of kids sitting in the classrooms with dogs nipping at their heels is
not what will happen,' she assured the school committee." Id.
5 See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding dog-sniff of students to be a Fourth Amendment "search"); Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 93
(7th Cir. 1980) (holding dog-sniff of student's person not a search); B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch.
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For thirty years, state and federal courts have struggled with the
constitutionality of suspicionless dog-sniff searches in schools. 6 Courts
strive to achieve a balance between one's Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and a school administrator' ability to
maintain a safe and productive school environment.' Federal courts remain
split as to whether close proximity dog-sniffs of students' individual persons are constitutional searches within the parameters of the Fourth
Amendment, and many state courts, including Massachusetts, have yet to
encounter this issue. 8 Moreover, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
("Mass. SJC") has not yet determined whether Article Fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights ("Article Fourteen") affords an individual
more substantive protection in the educational setting than is afforded to
them under the Fourth Amendment. 9 Consequently, the Mass. SJC has yet
to determine if broader protections will be extended to protect Massachusetts students against close proximity dog-sniffs while in school.' 0
The United States Supreme Court and other federal courts have repeatedly enforced the principle that students do not abandon their constitutional rights at the "school house gate;" however, courts have, with increas-

Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1267-69 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding suspicionless search of students unreasonable and unconstitutional); see also Jennifer Bradfield, Comment, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton: A Step Toward Upholding Suspicionless Dog-sni-Searches in Public Schools, 68 U. COLO.
L. REV. 475 (1997) (discussing probability of Supreme Court upholding suspicionless dog-sniffs
of students' lockers and persons).
6 See, e.g., Horton, 690 F.2d at 479 (holding dog-sniff of students is Fourth Amendment
"search"); Renfkow, 631 F.2d at 93 (holding reasonable dog-sniff of students not a search); Phimas, 192 F.3d at 1267-69 (holding suspicionless search of students unreasonable and unconstitutional).
7 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347-51 (1985) (holding search of student's purse
not an unreasonable search); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65
(1995) (holding mandatory drug testing of all student athletes reasonable); Brousseau v. Town of
Westerly, II F. Supp.2d 177, 183 (D. R.I. 1998) (holding search of student reasonable). In
TL.O., the decision to search was based on reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing and, therefore,
did not constitute an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. TL.O., 469
U.S. at 337. The TL.0. Court employed a balancing test to detennine reasonableness of search.
Id. In reaching its decision, the Vernonia Court balanced the students' privacy interests against
the government's interest in conducting the search. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65. In Brousseau,
the court found that the compelling safety concerns that prompted the school official's search
were sufficient to render the search reasonable in the absence of an effective alternative for addressing the concern. Brousseau, 11 F. Supp.2d at 183.
8 See infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing various and disparate federal circuit
court holdings).
9 See infra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing Mass. SJC's failure to determine extent of Article Fourteen in educational context).
'o See infra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing Mass. SJC's failure to definitively
compare Article Fourteen with Fourteenth Amendment in context of Massachusetts public
schools).
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ing frequency, chosen to balance individual rights with the safety of the
student body as a whole.'' Part II of this note discusses the history of dogsniff search litigation in the context of the Fourth Amendment. 2 Part III
explores current Massachusetts law regarding dog-sniff searches beyond
the education setting.' 3 Part IV discusses current Massachusetts law regarding searches of students and their belongings in schools without the use
of police dogs. 14 Finally, in light of a federal circuit split, and based on related prior Massachusetts holdings, Part V argues that the Mass. SJC
should recognize a student's reasonable expectation of privacy and consedog-sniff searches of students' persons absent
quently prohibit invasive
15

reasonable suspicion.

II. HISTORY OF DOG-SNIFF SEARCHES IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Fourth Amendment: What Is A "Search"?
The Fourth Amendment guarantees all individuals, including children and students, the right to be free from unwarranted and unreasonable
searches and seizures.' 6 A search occurs when the government intrudes on
an individual's subjective and objective reasonable expectation of privacy.1 7 The Fourth Amendment generally requires the government to ob-

II See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 (establishing that students maintain expectation of privacy, although lessened, while on school grounds); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (stating that children do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at
the schoolhouse gate"); Plumas, 192 F.3d at 1267 (recognizing students' privacy interests while
in on school grounds). The T.L.O. Court firmly established that a court must balance a student's
reasonable expectation of privacy with the school's legitimate need to maintain a safe learning
environment when determining the reasonableness of a search. TL.0. at 340-42. In Plumas, after balancing the searched student's privacy interests with the school's interest in conducting the
dog-sniff search to locate contraband, the court determined that the random and suspicionless
search was unreasonable in the circumstances. Plirnas, 192 F.3d at 1268.
12 See infra notes 34-55 and accompanying text (outlining history of litigation involving dogsniff searches).
13 See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text (discussing history of Massachusetts dogsniff search litigation).
14 See infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text (examining history of Fourth Amendment
and Article Fourteen search litigation in Massachusetts public schools).
i5 See infra notes 76-137 (explaining why Massachusetts should find random close proximity
dog-sniff searches of students unconstitutional).
16 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in relevant part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons .. .against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated." Id.
17 MASS. CONST. art. XIV (stipulating that a search occurs when one's reasonable expectation of privacy is violated); see also Commonwealth v. Montanez, 571 N.E.2d 1372, 1380 (Mass.
1991) (defining method used to evaluate one's reasonable expectation of privacy). The court
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tain a search warrant supported by the probable cause that a crime has occurred before a search can be conducted.'" Exceptions to the warrant and
probable cause requirements exist, however, when "special needs beyond
the normal need for law enforcement make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement[s] impracticable."' 9 In such circumstances, a special and important governmental need may justify an intrusion into an individual's
otherwise protected reasonable expectation of privacy. 20 When a situation
renders the need for a warrant and probable cause impracticable, the search

must, instead, satisfy a "reasonableness" standard. 2' To determine the reasonableness of a warrantless search, a court balances the government's
need to perform a search against the magnitude of the privacy invasion

stated that a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy has both a subjective and
objective component: (1)whether the defendant has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the search; and (2) whether society is willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable. Id.
18 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (holding warrant and probable cause
requirements unnecessary for student searches); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)
(setting forth definition of constitutional arrest and probable cause). See generally Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 27-31 (1968) (holding warrant and probable cause requirements unnecessary for "stop
and frisk" search where reasonable suspicion is present). The Beck court hinged the constitutionality of the arrest on whether at the time of the arrest, "the facts and circumstances within [the
arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense." Id. at 91.
19 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (upholding random and
suspicionless drug testing of student athletes); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873
(1987) (holding search of defendant's home, in absence of warrant and probable cause, constitutional); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 285 (1973) (holding warrantless search
of defendant's car without probable cause to be an unreasonable search and seizure due to case's
specific circumstances); Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (holding regulatory
scheme need not conform to warrant and probable cause requirements when searches meet "reasonable legislative or administrative standards"). The Fourth Amendment requires that searches
and seizures be reasonable, and although "both the concept of probable cause and the requirement
of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search ... in certain limited circumstances neither is
required." Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 277.
20 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 317-18 (1997) (finding mandatory drug testing of
public office candidates unconstitutional); see also Nat'l Treasury Employee's Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (holding mandatory drug testing of certain employees constitutional). The special needs exception to individualized suspicion usually involves an immediate
or serious public risk and this need must outweigh the need for individualized suspicion. Miller,
520 U.S. at 317-18. The court determined that the government's compelling interest in ensuring
that its employees were not drug users outweighed those drug tested employees' privacy interests.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66.
21 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652 (considering constitutionality of governmental search in
school). The Vernonia Court determined that, in accordance with the text of the Fourth Amendment, reasonableness must be considered when determining the constitutionality of a governmental search. Id.
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22
caused by the search regardless of whether probable cause exists.

B. What Constitutes A "Search" In The School Context
The Supreme Court has held that it is impracticable to require a
school administrator to obtain a warrant or to have probable cause before
searching a student for drugs or other contraband.23 Because a warrantless
search of this type is based on the special need to protect the entire student
body, a search must, therefore, only be considered "reasonable" to be constitutional.24 To be "reasonable," the need to perform the search must outweigh any privacy interest that a student may enjoy under the Fourth
Amendment.2 5 Conversely, when a search is random, includes a broad base
of students, and pertains to a compelling school need such as drug-use prevention, individualized suspicion is not required.26
In 1995, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Supreme
Court developed a modified "reasonableness" test for random, suspicionless searches in schools. 27 The court applied a three-factor analysis for

22 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-39 (holding administrative search of residence by health and
safety inspectors to be reasonable). Although the Court held that residence searches are significant intrusions upon privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, the warrantless
searches were considered reasonable because the governmental interest in preventing the development of hazardous conditions outweighed any individual privacy invasion. Id. at 535.
23 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 (recognizing warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable in public school context). The Court stated, "[T]he warrant requirement would 'unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures [that are]
needed,' and 'strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based upon probable cause'
would undercut 'the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order
in the schools."' Id. (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41).
24 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (recognizing reasonableness of a search depends upon context
of search).
25 Id.
26 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53 (1995) (establishing balancing test to determine "reasonableness" of search). In Vernonia, the Court held that suspicionless urinalysis testing of student athletes for illegal drugs did not constitute an unreasonable search. Id. at 657. The Court
reasoned that a blanket drug search of all student athletes was constitutional because an interest
existed that was sufficiently important to justify the need for the search. Id. But see Vernonia,
515 U.S. at 667 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's reasoning and decision).
Justice O'Connor argued that the Court's decision to dispense with individualized suspicion was
wrong. Id. She rejected the majority's reasoning that a "broad-based search regime" diluted the
accusatory nature of the search. Id. Justice O'Connor counter-argued that blanket searches, because they can involve "thousands or millions" of searches, "pose a greater threat to liberty" than
do suspicion-based searches because suspicion-based searches only "affect one person at a time."
Id. (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365 (1987)); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 827-28 (2002) (applying Vernonia balancing test and upholding random drug testing on students in extra-curricular activities).
27 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649 (discussing standard for determining reasonableness of
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balancing the students' privacy interests against the school administrator's
interest in conducting the search. 28 The three factors include 1) the nature
of the privacy interest; 2) the character of the intrusion; and 3) and the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern paired with the efficacy
of the search method.2 9
In New Jersey v. TL.O., 30 the Supreme Court considered school
searches that were not random, and held that searches in schools, a unique
setting, require a modified level of suspicion to justify a search. 3 1 To determine the reasonableness of a search, the T.L.O. Court introduced a twopart reasonableness inquiry which considered 1) whether the search was
justified at its inception, and 2) whether the search was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances that originally justified the search. 32 Although greatly lessened, a student's expectation
of privacy in the school
33
environment is not entirely eliminated.
searches in school context).
21

Id.at 664-65.

29 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-69. The Vernonia Court applied a three-factor analysis to
reach its decision enforcing the constitutionality of random drug testing of all student athletes. Id.
at 649. The three factor-analysis includes: I) the nature of the privacy interest; 2) the character
of the intrusion; and 3) the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern and the efficacy of
the search-method in addressing the concern. Id. at 654-66. With respect to satisfaction of the
first factor, the Court reasoned that a public school assumes "custodial and tutelary" responsibility for its students. Id.at 655-57. According to the second factor, the Court concluded that the
privacy interests compromised by the process of obtaining urine samples from students were negligible because the conditions under which the samples were collected were practically identical
to those experienced in public restrooms. Id.at 658-60. As to the third factor, the Court held that
the nature of the governmental concern, to quell and prevent student drug abuse, was important
and compelling. Id.at 660-62.
30 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
31 See id. at 340 (stipulating legality of search depends on reasonableness of search in all circumstances). The Court adopted a "totality of circumstances" test to determine if a search is reasonable. Id. at 365. This test is less stringent than the Fourth Amendment probable cause test.
Id. Furthermore, the Court determined that the search of a student by a school administrator is
justified if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a search will uncover evidence of
criminal activity or a violation of school rules. Id. at 341-42. The Court did not address whether
"reasonableness" requires individualized suspicion before a search may occur. T.L.O., 469 at 342
n.8.
32 T.L.O., 469 US. at 326. The Court adopted a two-prong "reasonableness" test. Id. The
prongs include 1) whether the search was justified at its inception, and 2) whether the search was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that that originally justified the search. Id. The
Court went on to state that, generally, a student search is considered "justified at its inception"
where reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that the search will produce evidence that the student violated a law or school rule. Id.at 341. The search is "related in scope" when the adopted
search methods are "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the student's age and sex and the nature of the infraction." Id. at 342.
33 See generally T.L.0., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding search of student with less than probable cause constitutionally permissible); Bradfield, supra note 5 (discussing constitutionality of
dog-sniff searches in public school arena).
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C. Past Cases Involving Dog-Sni/f Searches 0fA Student's Person
For more than twenty years, courts have wrestled with the issue of
whether the close proximity dog-sniffing of a student's person constitutes a
search within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment.3 4 In 1980, the
Seventh Circuit decided Doe v. Renfiow, 35 a case involving the use of police dogs to sniff 2780 students while seated at their desks during school
hours.3 6 In this case, the Renfroow court reasoned that the purpose of utilizing dogs in the classroom was merely to assist with the police officials' ob-

servations of students; the court subsequently held that a close proximity
and thus does not require
dog-sniff of a student does not constitute a search
37
a threshold of reasonable, individual suspicion.
In Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist.,38 a 1983 case sharing
nearly identical facts with Renftow, the Fifth Circuit reached an opposite
decision. 39 In Horton, the Fifth Circuit held that close proximity dogsniffing of a student's person is a Fourth Amendment search, particularly
when the dog actually touches the student.4 ° Consequently, a search of a
student's person could not be justified as reasonable without individualized
suspicion that a student engaged in unlawful behavior. 41 The court considered the use of police dogs to not only be a "search," but more specifically,
an unreasonable search because the up-close, sometimes touching, dogsniffs were considered unjustified intrusions upon the students' dignity and
security. 42 Sixteen years later, in B. C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist. 43 the

34

See, e.g., B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1267 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding

close proximity dog-sniff of students an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search); Horton v.
Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 488 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding close proximity dogsniff of students an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search); Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 94
(7th Cir. 1980) (holding close proximity dog-sniff of students not a Fourth Amendment search).
15 631 F.2d91 (7thCir. 1980).
36 Renfrow, 631 F.2d at 92.
37 Id. at 92-94 (holding close proximity dog-sniff of students an unreasonable Fourth
Amendment search). But see Renfrow, 631 F.2d at 94 (Swygert, J., dissenting) (arguing that
close-proximity dog-sniff of students was a Fourth Amendment search). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Swygert emphasized facts indicating that the dogs placed their noses on the students'
legs. Id. For this reason, Justice Swygert concluded that such actions constituted an unreasonable invasion upon personal security that would likely have long-lasting psychological repercussions. Id.. (quoting Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)).
38 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
39 See Horton, 690 F.2d at 479. Police dogs were brought into random classrooms to sniffsearch students sitting at their desks. Id.
40 Id.
41 See id. at 480 (citing Belnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y 1977)).
42 See id. at 482 (discussing reasonableness of canine sniff-search of students in classrooms).
The court stated, "The intrusion on dignity and personal security that goes with the type of canine
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Ninth Circuit reached a decision similar to the Fifth Circuit in Horton, and
held that a random, suspicionless dog-sniff of a student's person infringes
on a reasonable expectation of privacy and, hence, constitutes a search.44
Most United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have agreed that
"reasonableness" is generally contingent upon the level of offensiveness
involved with the dog-sniff.45 The courts have attempted to establish a distinction between what is considered offensive and what is considered an
inoffensive student dog-sniff.46 Most courts have implied that the action of
merely walking police dogs up and down the aisles of a classroom while
sniffing students at a reasonable distance for contraband may not be considered an unreasonable search. 47 These courts have only held that an unreasonable search occurs when the canine touches, or approaches touching
the student.48

inspection of the student's person . . . cannot be justified by the need to prevent abuse of drugs
and alcohol when there is no individualized suspicion, and we hold it unconstitutional." Id. at
481-82.
43 192 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1999).
44 See Plumas, 192 F.3d at 1266 (holding random, suspicionless dog-sniff-search of students
unreasonable absent a drug problem in school). The court reasoned that any close proximity
sniffing of a person is offensive and highly intrusive whether the "sniffer be canine or human."
Id. at 1266 (quoting Horton, 690 F.2d at 479). The court upheld the district court's finding that
the dog-sniff was highly intrusive because the body and its odors are highly personal. Id. at 1267.
The court also recognized that dogs "often engender irrational fear," particularly when a search is
sudden, unannounced, and involuntary. Id.(citing Horton, 690 F.2d at 483).
45 See, e.g., Horton, 690 F.2d at 478-81 (holding random dog-sniffs of people indecent and
demeaning and hence unreasonable); Plumas, 192 F.3d at 1266; United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d
291, 294 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding dog-sniff-search of defendant during routine border stop reasonable). The Kelly court reasoned that "persons approaching an international border and checkpoint can reasonably expect to be stopped, questioned, and possibly searched." 302 F.3d at 294.
It distinguished this case from Horton, emphasizing that "the Government's power to conduct
searches for contraband in order to secure its international borders is significant." Id. at 295.
Moreover, the court noted that "searches conducted at an international border are less likely to
cause embarrassment or loss of dignity to the subject. In Horton, the court was particularly concerned about the impact of the public, in-class searches on young adolescents." Id.
46 See Horton, 690 F.2d at 481-82 (holding sniff of student's person to be invasion of privacy
and dignity); see also Plumas, 192 F.3d at 1266 (determining involuntary dog-sniff of students'
persons to be invasion of privacy not outweighed by government interest to deter student drug
use). In Horton, trained narcotic sniffing dogs touched students while assisting police officers
searching for narcotics. Horton, 690 F.2d at 481. In Plumas, however, the dog did not "sniff
around each student, touch the students in any manner, or display signs of excitement ...the dog
was always three to four feet from the students as they exited and re-entered the classroom."
Plumas, 192 F.3d at 1270.
47 See Plumas 192 F.3d at 1266 (holding that close proximity search of person always offensive); see also Horton, 690 F.2d at 479 (holding actions of sniffing around student, putting dog's
nose on student to be intrusive in nature). The Horton court specifically reserved judgment on
whether the "use of dogs to sniff people in some other manner, e.g., at some distance, is a
search." Id. at 479.
48 See Horton, 690 F.2d at 477-79 (discussing offensive nature of close-proximity dog sniff
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D. CurrentLaw RegardingDog-SnijfSearches Beyond The Educational
Setting
The issue of the constitutionality of dog-sniff searches extends far
beyond the educational context. 49 The Supreme Court has held that the use
of well-trained narcotic-detecting dogs to reveal the location of contraband
during a lawful traffic stop generally does not implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests. 50 Conversely, when a dog-sniff results in direct
contact with a person, the federal courts generally acknowledge that a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred. 51 If,

searches): see also Plumas 192 F.3d at 1270 (reasoning that dog-sniffs that did not touch students
were not offensive or unreasonable). The Horton court emphasized the impact of close proximity
dog-sniff searches on students by stating, "One can imagine the embarrassment which a young
adolescent, already self-conscious about his or her body, might experience when a dog, being
handled by a representative of the school administration, enters the classroom specifically for the
purpose of sniffing the air around his or her person." Horton, 690 F.2d at 479. But see Plumas,
192 F.3d at 1271-72 (Brunetti, J., concurring) (arguing close proximity search inoffensive and
reasonable). Justice Brunetti noted, in relevant text:
Whether we or the public find government conduct offensive is irrelevant to Fourth
Amendment analysis because Fourth Amendment analysis is not dependent upon
whether government conduct is offensive. Instead, Fourth Amendment analysis depends on whether government conduct unreasonably invades a reasonable expectation
of privacy ...

this [offensiveness] analysis ...

cannot satisfy the analytical standards

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence prescribes.
Id.
49 See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 408, 408-09 (2005) (examining constitutionality of
dog-sniff search during routine traffic stop); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)
(holding exposure of luggage to trained narcotic-sniffing dog not a Fourth Amendment search);
United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding dog-sniff of luggage did not
constitute search).
50 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (holding dog-sniff search of car exterior not a search under
Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n.22 (1984) (reiterating that search occurs when one's reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed).
51 See Horton, 690 F.2d at 479 (holding actions of sniffing around student, putting dog's
nose on student to be intrusive in nature); Plumas, 192 F.3d at 1266-67 (holding non-contact dog
sniff of students at school constitutes Fourth Amendment search); U.S. v. Reyes, 349 F.3d 219,
223-24 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding non-contact dog-sniff of defendant passenger when exiting bus at
station not a Fourth Amendment search); see also Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 94 (7th Cir.
1980) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (arguing that where dogs physically touched students while sniffing an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search occurred). But see Renji-ow, 631 F.2d at 92 (holding dog sniff of students where physical contact occurred not a Fourth Amendment search). In
Reyes, the court considered both the Horton and Plumas decisions and recognized that "close
proximity" is an "element" that should be considered when determining if a dog-sniff of a person
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. Reves, 349 F.3d at 224. The Reves court held that the
defendant, who was located four to five feet away from the sniffing dog, was not in "close proximity" at the time he alerted police to the presence of cocaine. Id. Consequently, the sniff was
considered "minimally intrusive" and did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Id.
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however, the search-situation is one in which an individual has a lessened
expectation of privacy, reasonable suspicion is the only requisite needed to
commence such a search.52 The federal courts have affirmed that a close
proximity dog-sniff of a person constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.53
Moreover, courts generally agree that if the sniff search of an individual's
person is deemed "reasonable," the search, thus, does not exceed the parameters of the Fourth Amendment. 54 Invasion of one's privacy and dignity during a search serves as the determinative factor when establishing a

search's "reasonableness."
III. HISTORY OF DOG-SNIFF SEARCHES IN MASSACHUSETTS
Although Massachusetts courts have yet to make a decision regarding the propriety of random and suspicionless dog-sniffs of students' persons, they have ruled on the propriety of police dog-sniffs outside of the
public school arena. 5 6 In Commonwealth v. FeyenordJ7 [hereinafter
Feyenord II], the Mass. SJC held that the exterior dog-sniff of a detained
vehicle is not a "search" under the United States Constitution or under Ar-

52 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding information that a person
knowingly exposes to public is not protected by Fourth Amendment); see also United States v.
Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding dog-sniff-search of individual's groin reasonable because search occurred during "routine border search"); see also United States v.
Maldonado-Espinosa, 767 F. Supp. 1176, 1187 (D.P.R. 1991) (determining dog-sniff not a search
due to lessened expectation of privacy in airports). Contra Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499
F. Supp. 223, 234 (E.D.Tex. 1980) (holding dog-sniff-search in school not analogous to search in
airport because school searches are mandatory for all students).
53 See. e.g., Horton, 690 F.2d at 474-75 (discussing prior dog-sniff search related cases);
Plumas, 192 F.3d at 1266 (discussing prior decisions relating to personal contact in dog-sniff
searches in schools); Kelly, 302 F.3d at 295 (holding up-close sniffing at border constitutes a
search).
54 See, e.g., Horton, 690 F.2d at 474-75 (discussing prior dog-sniff search related cases);
Plumas, 192 F.3d at 1266 (discussing prior decisions relating to personal contact in dog-sniff
searches in schools); Kelly, 302 F.3d at 295 (holding up close sniffing at border search to be a
search).
55 See, e.g., Horton, 690 F.2d at 474-75 (discussing prior dog-sniff search related cases);
Plumas, 192 F.3d at 1266 (discussing prior decisions relating to personal contact in dog-sniff
searches in schools); Kelly, 302 F.3d at 295 (holding up close sniffing at border search to be a
search); see also Plumas, 192 F.3d at 1271-72 (Brunetti, J., concurring) (arguing some close
proximity searches inoffensive and reasonable); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (holding electronic recording and eavesdropping of petitioner's telephone booth conversation constituted Fourth
Amendment search). The Katz court stated in relevant text, "[O]nce it is recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects people -and not simply "areas"-against unreasonable searches and
seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." 389 U.S. at 353.
56 See Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 833 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 2005) [hereinafter Fevenord II].
57 833 N.E.2d 590, 600 (Mass. 2005).
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ticle Fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 58 The court reasoned that the intrusion caused by the use of a dog-sniff is limited and,
therefore, it logically follows that the searched individual is not subject to
embarrassment or inconvenience that could otherwise render the search unreasonable. 59 Furthermore, the Mass. SJC stated that neither it, nor society,
were prepared to recognize an individual's expectation of privacy with regard to the odors emanating from illegal contraband concealed on that person. 60 The Massachusetts Appeals Court's decision in Feyenord [hereinafter Feyenord I], which was ultimately upheld by the Mass. SJC,
specifically stated that the act of sniffing or touching that can accompany a
similar search might, in alternative circumstances, be considered a degrading intrusion that should outweigh any governmental justification. 61 The
Mass. SJC recognized that situations may exist where a dog-sniff would
constitute a Fourth Amendment search, particularly when a dog is used to
sniff the body of a person rather than, for example, his luggage or vehicle
exterior. 62 Prescriptively, the court emphasized that the constitutionality of
a trained dog intruded upon one's reasonable
a search depends on whether
63
expectation of privacy.

58 Id.at 594 (upholding lower court's decision that dog-sniff during lawful traffic stop was
not a search); see also Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 815 N.E.2d 628, 635 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004)
[hereinafter FevenordI] (finding that dog-sniff-search did not intrude upon defendant's legitimate
expectation of privacy).
59 See Feyenord 1, 815 N.E.2d at 634 (emphasizing impersonal nature of dog-sniff search of
vehicle exterior). The Massachusetts Appeals Court stated that embarrassment and inconvenience are two factors that may indicate a heightened level of intrusiveness. Id. (quoting United
States v. Place, 642 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). It also stated, "'We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in
the content of the information revealed by the procedure."' Id.(quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707);
see also Feyenord I, 833 N.E.2d at 601 (upholding the Massachusetts Appeals Court's decision).
60 Fevenord11, 833 N.E.2d at 601 n.12 (citing the Massachusetts Appeals Court's decision in
FeyenordL, 815 N.E.2d at 634).
833 N.E.2d at 601, n.12 (referencing Appeals Court's decision to reserve
61 See FeyenordI1,
judgment on issue of dog-sniff searches of individuals' persons). The Mass. SJC noted that the
use of dog-sniffs in other settings, such as to sniff a person's body, was not at issue in this case
and would require an independent constitutional evaluation. Id; see also FeyenordL 815 N.E.2d
at 634 (emphasizing that the FeyenordI decision did not apply to constitutionality of close proximity dog-sniff searches). The court stated in relevant text,
The issues are different not because society is prepared to recognize an expectation of
privacy in the odor of contraband concealed upon a person, as opposed to the odor of
contraband concealed in a car, but because the very act of sniffing a person, and the
touching that may accompany that sniffing, may be degradingly intrusive.
Id.
62 Feyenord11, 833 N.E.2d at 601 n.12.
63 Fevenord 11, 833 N.E.2d at 601 n.12 (Mass. 2005) (referencing Appellate Court's decision); see also Feyenord 1,815 N.E.2d at 634 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (considering constitutional-
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IV. HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES IN
MASSACHUSETTS SCHOOLS
The Mass. SJC has already encountered numerous cases implicating Fourth Amendment issues regarding the search of students, their belongings, and their lockers without the use of contraband sniffing dogs. 6 4 It
is not clear, however, whether Article Fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 65 provides for a stricter reasonableness standard during
school searches than does the reasonableness standard of the Fourth
Amendment as defined by New Jersey v. T.L.O; in other words, the Mass.
SJC has yet to determine if school officials are required to have probable
cause to believe a legal violation has occurred prior to conducting searches
in schools.6 6 In Commonwealth v. Buccella,67 the Mass. SJC applied the

ity of close proximity dog-sniff searches of an individual's person). The Appeals Court stated,
"The question always to be asked if whether the use of a trained dog intrudes on a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id. (quoting United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366 (2d Cir.
1985)).
64 See Commonwealth v. Damian D., 752 N.E.2d 679, 682-83 (Mass. 2001) (holding search
based on violation of school rule unrelated to possession of contraband or threat of violence was
unreasonable); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1366 (Mass. 1992) (holding student
had reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker); see also Theodore v. Delaware Valley Sch.
Dist., 761 A.2d 652, 663 (Penn. 2003) (holding students' legitimate expectation of privacy in
lockers to be minimal); Ex rel Isaiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637, 649-51 (Wis. 1993) (holding students
do not have reasonable expectation of privacy in lockers). In Snyder, the court held that a school
code stating that a student has a right not to have his or her locker subjected to unreasonable
searches created a reasonable expectation of privacy in students' lockers. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at
1366. Other state courts have also recognized a legitimate expectation of privacy in students'
lockers absent a school policy to the contrary. See Theodore, 761 A.2d at 663; Ex rel Isaiah B.,
500 N.W.2d at 649-50. The Theodore court determined that a student's expectation of privacy in
his or her locker is minimal where the locker is the school's property, the locker combination is
kept on file by the school, and students are warned that their locker's may be subject to a "reasonable suspicion" search. Theodore, 761 A.2d at 663. The Ex rel Isaiahcourt reached the decision
based on the fact that the public school system had a written policy retaining ownership and possessory control of school lockers and notice of this policy was given to the students. Id. at 649.
65 MASS. CONST. art. XIV.
66 MASS. CONST. art. XIV; see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985) (adopting
a "Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause"); see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Buccella, 751 N.E.2d 373, 383 n.9 (Mass. 2001) (explaining where defendant
made no Article Fourteen violation, claims court could not address issue); Damian D., 752
N.E.2d at 683 (noting that court's conclusion that search was unreasonable left residual Article
Fourteen question unanswered); Snvder, 597 N.E.2d at 1366 (failing to compare reasonableness
requirements of Article Fourteen with Fourth Amendment). Article Fourteen reads as follows:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of
his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are
contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by
oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in
suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property,
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New Jersey v. T.L.O. "reasonable under all circumstances" test in the
school context. 6 ' The court determined that a search must be reasonable at
its inception and it must also be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the search at its inception.69
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Snyder, 70 the Mass. SJC emphasized that a student maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or
her locker. 71 As a result of this expectation, the court held that, under Article Fourteen, probable cause is the maximum standard of reasonableness
that a Massachusetts court could constitutionally require when a school
search is performed.72 The Mass. SJC decided that a school's legitimate

be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws.
MASS. CONST. art. XIV.
67 751 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 2001).
68 See id. at 384 (finding search satisfied both prongs of FL.O. "totality of circumstances"
test). A search is reasonably related in scope "when the measures adopted are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Buccella, 751 N.E.2d at 384 (Mass. 2001) (quoting TL.O.,
469 U.S. at 342).
69 Buccella, 751 N.E.2d at 384-85 (2001) (discussing constitutionality of searches in
schools).
70 751 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992).
71 See Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1366 (holding students maintain reasonable and protected expectation of privacy in lockers). In Snyder, the court went on to state that because the defendant
student had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker, he accordingly had a right to argue
his Fourth Amendment right be free from an unreasonable search and seizure. Id. The Snyder
court also acknowledged that the defendant had the right to make a similar argument under Article Fourteen because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker. Id. The Snyder
court held, however, that because there was sufficient probable cause to believe the defendant had
marijuana in his locker, the search of the defendant's locker without the authority of a search warrant was reasonable; therefore the search was in compliance with the Fourth Amendment and
T.L.O.'s "reasonable under all circumstances test." Id. The Snyder court also went on to state
that the search did not violate Article Fourteen because Article Fourteen allows for the dispensation of the search warrant requirement when probable cause to search exists. Id. at 1367. The
Snyder court did not determine, however, whether Article Fourteen's requirements impose a
stricter standard on school searches than those of the Fourth Amendment; instead, the court sidestepped the issue by stating, "certainly, [Article Fourteen] imposes no higher standard than probable cause . . . if there was probable cause to search the locker when it was searched, the requirements of [Article Fourteen] were met." 597 N.E.2d at 1367. But see Ex rel Isaiah B., 500
N.W.2d 637, 641 (Wis. 1993) (holding student did not maintain reasonable expectation of privacy
in lockers). In Isaiah B., the court emphasized that students did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their lockers where the school had promulgated a locker policy retaining possessory
control of lockers. Id.
72 See Snider, 597 N.E.2d at 1366-67 (discussing whether search of student's locker with
probable cause was reasonable under both state and federal constitutions). The Snyder court's
decision suggested, however, that the standard of reasonableness that a Massachusetts court may
impose on school searches under Article Fourteen could be less than probable cause in accor-
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interest, combined with only a minor degree of intrusiveness caused by a
search, renders a search "reasonable" when there is a threat to the student
body's safety.73 In prior cases involving locker searches, including Snyder,
the Mass. SJC found each respective search to be "reasonable" because
probable cause was clearly established and supported with convincing evidence.74 Consequently, the Mass. SJC has yet to address the issue of
whether Article Fourteen imposes a stricter standard than the T.L.O. "reasonableness under all circumstances" standard that is necessary under the
Fourth Amendment to conduct75 both random searches and searches supported by suspicion in schools.
V. MASSACHUSETTS SHOULD FIND CLOSE PROXIMITY DOGSNIFFS OF STUDENTS' INDIVIDUAL PERSONS TO BE
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
Massachusetts courts have yet to encounter the issue of whether a
close proximity dog-sniff of a student's individual person is a search, and if
so, whether it is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and Article Fourteen. 76 To be considered unreasonable, the Mass. SJC is encour-

dance with the "reasonable under all circumstances" test adopted by the T.L.O. Court. Id. at
1367.
73 Id.(holding that sufficient probable cause rendered search of student's locker reasonable).
71 See id.at 1367-68 (finding knowledge of reliable information of student's possession of
marijuana in book bag to be sufficient probable cause); see also Commonwealth v. Lawrence L.,
792 N.E.2d 109, 113-14 (Mass. 2003) (determining odor of marijuana emanating from student,
knowledge of prior incident, and student's response to questions sufficient probable cause).
75 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985) (adopting a "Fourth Amendment
standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause"); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Buccelia, 751 N.E.2d 373, 383 n.9 (Mass. 2001) (explaining where defendant made no Article Fourteen violation, claims court could not address issue); Commonwealth v. Damian D., 752 N.E.2d
679, 683 (Mass. 2001) (noting that court's conclusion that search was unreasonable left residual
Article Fourteen question unanswered); Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1366 (failing to compare reasonableness requirements of Article Fourteen with Fourth Amendment); see also Snyder, 597 N.E.2d
at 1367. In Snyder, court stated,
The more substantial issue in this case is whether the search and seizure was unreasonable under Article Fourteen of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth. In construing the Constitution of the Commonwealth, we are not
bound to follow the standards that the Supreme Court of the United States has adopted
in applying provisions of the Constitution of the United States that are similar or even
identical to provisions in the Commonwealth's Constitution.
Id.at 1367.
76 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing the court's reservation of judgment on the matter in FeyenordIand FeyenordHdecisions); see also supra notes 66-75 (discussing the Mass. SJC's failure to address extent of Article Fourteen's application to school searches).
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aged to find that each individual student's expectation of privacy in a close
proximity dog-sniff search outweighs the school's need to protect the entire
student body. 77 Furthermore, it is unclear whether Massachusetts would
lower the "offensiveness" standard that has been set by the prior United
States Appellate Courts decisions, and consequently find searches to be unreasonable in situations where other jurisdictions may consider the same
search to be reasonable. 8 In light of prior decisions regarding general dogsniffs and schools searches, the Mass. SJC could hold both suspicionless
and non-suspicionless close proximity dog-sniff searches of students to be
hence, in violation of both Article Fourteen and
unreasonable searches, 7and
9
the Fourth Amendment.
A. Massachusettsand Article Fourteen
Although the Mass. SJC established that a police dog-sniff of a
car's exterior does not constitute a search as defined in Feyenord II, it is yet
to be determined whether close proximity dog-sniffs of an individual's person constitutes a search. 80 Should the court decide this issue in the affirmative, the Mass. SJC should then also determine if Article Fourteen affords
greater protections than those provided in the Fourth Amendment and in
TL.O.81 Ultimately, the court must decide if close proximity dog-sniffs require probable cause and individualized suspicion prior to conducting the
search.82
Based on the Mass. SJC's express acknowledgement of the intrusive nature of close proximity dog-sniffs in Feyenord II, it is reasonable to
suggest that the Mass. SJC would find a close proximity dog-sniff of a student's individual person to constitute a search.8 3 To do so, the Mass. SJC
could find that the sniff intrudes on a constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy.84 The Mass. SJC has already unequivocally deter77 See supra note 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing holding of T.L.O.).
78 See suipra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing various court interpretations of

"offensiveness" in context of in-school dog-sniff searches).
79 See MASS. CONST. art. XIV (granting Massachusetts citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures).
90 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (indicating Mass. SJC would reach different decision in close proximity dog-sniff situation).
81 See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing possibility that Massachusetts may
afford its students greater protection than other jurisdictions).
82 See sutpra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (expounding Massachusetts Appeals Court
and Mass. SJC's prescriptive standard for close proximity dog searches).
83 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (indicating the Mass. SJC's likely inclination to
hold close proximity dog-sniff search of one's person unconstitutional).
84 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (stipulating what is required to establish viola-

184

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XIII

mined that students maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
lockers absent a school policy to the contrary. 85 These Mass. SJC holdings
indicate that Massachusetts recognizes that students retain privacy interests
in their personal belongings within the schoolhouse doors; logically, the
Mass. SJC should favor the decision arrived upon in Plumas and extend
Fourth Amendment and Article Fourteen privacy rights to the student's
person as well 6
If the Mass. SJC holds that a close proximity dog-sniff of a student's individual person constitutes a search, the court will then have to determine if that search is reasonable. 87 The Mass. SJC should expand the
lessened standard of reasonableness adopted by the T.L.O. Court and, under
a more protective Article Fourteen, require school administrators to have
sufficient probable cause to believe that a crime or violation of school code
has been committed before a search may be conducted. 88 In accordance
with the Fourth Amendment, Article Fourteen, and the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Vernonia, the Mass. SJC is encouraged to hold that any random, suspicionless, close proximity dog-sniffs of an entire student population that significantly implicate student privacy interests constitutes an unreasonable search. 89 An analysis under the Fourth Amendment, Article
Fourteen, and Vernonia would also establish, however, that individualized
suspicion is not necessary so long as the students' privacy interests implicated by the dog-sniff are minimal and the government or school administrator's interest in maintaining a safe student body would otherwise be
compromised if individual suspicion was necessary. 90 The Mass. SJC is
thus left with the difficult task of applying this analysis and determining
which dog-sniff searches are considered "reasonable" intrusions, therefore

tion of one's reasonable expectation of privacy).
85 See supra note 64-75 and accompanying text (delineating and describing Mass. SJC cases
upholding reasonable expectation of privacy in lockers).
86 See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text (describing Mass. SJC's affirmation of the
reasonable expectation students have in their lockers).
87 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (expounding reasonableness requirement when
probable cause and warrant are not required).
88 See supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining standard of reasonableness adopted
by T.L.O. Court that stops short of probable cause); see also supra note 71 and accompanying
text (expounding Snyder court's decision that Article Fourteen does not impose a higher standard
than probable cause).
89 See supra note 21-33 and accompanying text (indicating that unusual context of dog-sniff
searches in schools requires careful consideration).
90 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing three-factor analysis used to determine "reasonableness" of suspicionless searches); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text
(explaining Re'es court's holding that dog-sniff not performed in close proximity of defendant is
minimally intrusive).
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dispensing of the need for reasonable suspicion or probable cause.91
Accordingly, using the Vernonia test to determine the "reasonableness" of suspicionless dog-sniff searches in schools, the Mass. SJC could
assess three factors: 1) the nature of the student's privacy interest; 2) the
character of the intrusion; and 3) the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern and the efficacy of suspicionless close proximity dog-sniff
searches in schools for achieving this goal.9 2 An analysis of the first factor
would require a consideration of a particular student's age and the school's
custodial responsibility as temporary guardians. 93 When applying the second factor of the Vernonia test, the Mass. SJC should consider whether
student privacy interests compromised by a close proximity dog-sniff
searches are significant or negligible.94 Finally, to consider the third factor
and measure a sniff s efficacy, the Mass. SJC should closely consider the
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drug use amongst the particular Massachusetts school districts' students, combined with the affects
of drugs on both the user and the entire student body. 95
In United States v. Kelly, the Fifth Circuit utilized the Vernonia test
and identified the distinction between close proximity dog-sniff searches
occurring at a border stop and those occurring in a school.96 The Kelly
court distinguished individuals who can expect to be searched when crossing the border from school students who generally have no reason to anticipate a dog-sniff search. 97 As to the first prong of the Vernonia test, the
Kelly court, like the Horton court, emphasized the vulnerability of the student population and the need to protect students from embarrassing and potentially degrading dog-sniff searches.9" Using Kelly and Horton as precedent, it is reasonable that the Mass. SJC should recognize that close
proximity dog-sniff searches of public school students' individual persons
are not minimally intrusive or negligible due to the young age of such stu-

91 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing court's application of first factor
when analyzing particular facts of the Vernonia case).
92 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (expounding three-factor Vernonia test).
93 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (delineating court's application of three-factor
analysis utilized in Vernonia).
94 See supra note 61 (discussing Mass. SJC's discussion of intrusive nature of close proximity dog-sniff searches in Fevenord II decision); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text
(discussing court's application of second factor to factual circumstances of Vernonia).
95 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing court's application of third factor to
factual circumstances of Vernonia).
96 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding of Kelly).
97 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing KellY court's reasoning that students
do not reasonably expect random searches while at school).
98 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (emphasizing reasoning used in Horton decision
and affirming need to protect students from such unreasonable searches).
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dents in grades kindergarten through twelve as well as each student's wardlike status during school hours. 99 The Mass. SJC should protect Massachusetts's students from the potential embarrassment and loss of dignity that
00
can be caused by a close proximity dog-sniff search of a student's body.'
Additionally, as to the second prong of the Vernonia test, the Kelly
court recognized that the government's need to perform close proximity
dog-sniff searches to detect contraband and protect the United States outweighed the level of intrusion caused by the highly invasive dog-sniff
search of the plaintiff.1° 1 Quoting Horton, however, the Kelly court reasoned that the level of intrusion on dignity and personal security caused by
a close proximity dog-sniff search in a school is not justified by the need to
prevent drug or alcohol abuse absent individualized suspicion. 0 2 The
Mass. SJC is encouraged to adopt this reasoning and recognize that the
highly intrusive act of a close proximity dog-sniff search of students far
outweighs the government's need to perform the search; this need sharply
contrasts with the same search's necessity in the context of a border
search. 0 3 Consequently, the Mass. SJC could hold that a close proximity
dog-sniff of a student's individual person fails the Vernonia test and is an
unreasonable
search under both the Fourth Amendment and Article Four04
teen.
Not all close proximity dog-sniff searches, however, are random or
suspicionless.10 5 Applying the T.L.O. "reasonableness under all circumstances" test to a search of an individual student, the Mass. SJC should assess whether the search of each particular student was justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified
performance of the search.10 6 To determine if a search is reasonably related

99 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing facts and respective holdings
in
Kelly and Horton).
100 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (detailing potential "embarrassment and loss of

dignity" that can be caused by close proximity searches); see also supra note 61 (expounding
Fevenord I's suggestions that close-proximity police dog-sniffs may be considered "degradingly
intrusive").
101 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing application of the offensiveness
factor considered by the Vernonia test).
102 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (distinguishing Kelly from Horton).
103 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (reasoning that government's need to perform
border searches outweighs intrusive degree of dog-sniff search used on plaintiff).
104 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (expounding Vernonia Court's application of
three-prong analysis for determining constitutionality of random student searches).
105 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing TL.O. holding that student search
was not random).
106 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (articulating the reasonableness test adopted in
TL.O.).
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in scope, the Mass. SJC could assess whether the dog-sniff search satisfied
the two-prong T.L.O. test.10 7 First, the Mass. SJC would consider if the
dog-sniff search is reasonably related to the objective of preventing drug
use and violence. 0 8 Second, the Mass. SJC would consider whether the
search was excessively intrusive in light of the age and genders of the students as well as the nature of the infraction. 0 9 Although dog-sniff searches
are reasonably related to the prevention of drug abuse problems in schools,
past Mass. SJC decisions indicate that the it is reasonable for the Mass. SJC
to hold that a close proximity dog-sniff search is excessively intrusive and
thus fails the second prong of this test.' 10 The second prong of the "reasonableness under all circumstances" test may threaten the reasonableness of
all close proximity dog-sniff searches in schools, particularly when performed on young children or when no existing or prominent drug problem
exists in the school to create individualized suspicion."' For this reason,
the Mass. SJC realistically could hold that, in most school settings, absent
reasonable grounds to suspect an individual
student, a highly intrusive,
11 2
close proximity search fails the T.L.O. test.
Federal circuit court holdings that have addressed the issue of the
reasonableness of close proximity dog-sniff searches in schools remain inconsistent.'1 3 Both Horton and Plumas involved search situations in which
the respective courts determined that the drug sniffing dogs were unreasonably close to the students. 1 4 In Renfrow, however, the court determined
that because the dogs were only present in the classroom to assist the
school official's observation of the students, a sniff of students seated at
their desks, during which the dogs physically touched the students, did not
constitute a Fourth Amendment search. 1' 5 All Federal Circuit Courts that
107

See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining definition of phrase "related in

scope" articulated in T.L.O.).
109 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing factors to consider when determining whether a search is "related in scope").
109 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining definition of phrase
"related in
scope" articulated in T.L.O.).
110 See supra note 31-32 and accompanying text (describing the "reasonableness in all circumstances" test established in T.L.O.); see also supra note 61 (quoting FevenordI court's description of close-proximity dog-sniff search of individual persons as potentially "degradingly
intrusive").
I See supra note 32 and accompanying text (expounding two prongs of T.L.O.'s "reasonableness in all circumstances" test).
112 See supra note 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of T.L.O.'s "reasonableness in all circumstances" test).
113 See supra notes 34 and accompanying text (discussing prior holdings reached by other
circuits).
114 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (reiterating holdings of Horton and Plunas).
15 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (articulating holding in Renfrow).
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have directly addressed the issue of whether a close proximity dog-sniff is
an unreasonable search have placed considerable emphasis on the proximity of the dog to the student while the search is being conducted. 1 6 Ultimately, based upon the consistency of all the Federal Circuit courts' decisions, as well as the reasoning employed by the Mass. SJC in the Feyenord
decision, it is reasonable that the Mass. SJC could also hold that a dog-sniff
that actually touches a student, comes close to touching a student, or at
least poses a legitimate threat to the safety of the student, is always considered an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and Article
Fourteen. 117
B. Offensiveness - DevelopingA Standard To Measure Reasonableness
Prior decisions provide little insight as to where a distinct line
should be drawn between an "offensive" or "inoffensive" close proximity
dog-sniff." 8 In Renfrow, the Seventh Circuit determined that a search did
not occur because students, who sat at their desks while drug-detecting
dogs sniffed the air but not the students' persons, did not have a justified
expectation of privacy; as a result, the court determined that a search did
not occur."19 In Horton, students were physically touched by the sniffingdogs, causing the court to hold such a search was unreasonable.' 20 In Plumas, however, although students were not physically touched by the drugsniffing dogs, the court held that the search was unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment.' 2' Consequently, precedent fails to establish a clear, bright-line rule for determining the level of intrusiveness necessary to deem a search offensive, and hence, unreasonable. 122 Moreover,
as the dissenting opinion in Plumas emphasized, there is no constitutional
basis upon which "offensiveness" can be viably used as a method of gaug-

116 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (detailing holdings of Horton, Plumas, and
Justice Swygert's dissenting opinion in Renfrow).
117 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (outlining reasoning employed by circuits
in prior holdings); see also supra notes 59-61 (discussing factors considered by Massachusetts
Appeals Court and Mass. SJC in Feyenordl and FeyenordHdecisions).
118 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (expounding various opinions regarding offensive nature of searches).
119 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning used by Renfrow
court in determining that dog-sniffs of students are not searches).
120 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting reasoning used by Horton court).
121 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (delineating reasoning employed by Phlnas
court).

122 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (emphasizing discrepancies between prior court

holdings).
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ing the "reasonableness" of a search.1 23 The dissenting opinion in Plumas
went on to state that a proper Fourth Amendment analysis should only consider whether
an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy" has been
124
violated.
The Mass. SJC, however, has indicated that the search's level of
"offensiveness" does serve as an integral factor when determining whether
one's reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated.1 25 In Feyenord
I/, the Mass. SJC determined that a dog-sniff of a properly stopped vehicle
is not a search. 26 The Mass. SJC came to this conclusion after determining
that the defendant's expectation of privacy in the odor of illegal drugs
emanating from his car was not one which society could recognize as reasonable. 27 Furthermore, the Mass. SJC determined that the sniff of a car's
exterior is so limited in nature that the property owner is not subjected to
the embarrassment or inconvenience that may be
caused by "less discrimi' 28
methods."'
investigative
intrusive
more
and
nate
In reaching its decision in Feyenord II, the Mass. SJC was careful
to emphasize that a distinction exists between dog-sniffs of a properly
stopped vehicle and dog-sniffs in "other settings," including the sniff of a
person's body. 129 The Mass. SJC noted that an issue arising from the dogsniff of a person's body would have to be "evaluated based on whether the
privacy expectation in each of those settings is one society is willing to
deem reasonable."' 30 Schools, however, are unique settings with regard to
Fourth Amendment searches.' 3' Close proximity dog-sniffs within schools
would, therefore, require close and careful consideration.' 32 Just as the
Fifth Circuit Kelly court emphasized the differences that existed between
123 See supra note 48 (quoting Justice Brunetti's dissenting opinion in Plumas).
124 See supra note 48 (discussing absence of "offensiveness" standard in proper Fourth
Amendment analysis).
125 See supra note 59 (discussing embarrassment and inconvenience as indicators of intrusive
search).
126 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing Feyenord's facts and circumstances).
127 See supra notes 58-59 (discussing reasonable expectation of privacy standard when determining constitutionality of dog-sniffs).
128 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (emphasizing reasoning employed by Feyenord
II court).
129 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (highlighting that issue of close proximity
dog-sniffs is separate issue yet to be decided).
130 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing potential standard to be used
when determining offensiveness of close-proximity dog-sniff).
131 See supra note 23 and accompanying text (establishing special need exists in public
school setting, thus dispensing of warrant and probable cause requirements).
132 See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for applying special need
exception in public school searches).
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close proximity dog-sniff searches performed at border stops and those performed at schools, the Mass. SJC will likely reach the same result when
analyzing the facts of FeyenordH as compared to a sniff of a student's person in a school. 133 Consequently, in accordance with the consideration that
the Feyenord H court gave to close proximity dog-sniff searches of individual people, the Mass. SJC will likely hold that a student's privacy expectation to be free from suspicionless dog-sniffs 34of his or her body is one
that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.'
VI. CONCLUSION
Massachusetts courts should find that a random close proximity
dog-sniff of a student or group of students constitutes a search. To allow
large dogs to approach innocent students and sniff each student's person in
a highly intrusive and offensive manner is a violation of those individuals'
Fourth Amendment and Article Fourteen rights. This type of dog-sniff
search not only intrudes upon a student's subjective expectation of privacy,
but also upon a socially recognized expectation of privacy.
Furthermore, Massachusetts should find that an up close dog-sniff
search of an entire student population, which lacks individualized suspicion
under the Fourth Amendment, is unreasonable. T.L.O. may have established a lessened expectation of privacy in schools, but it did not eliminate
all Fourth Amendment rights belonging to students. A student's reasonable
expectation of privacy to be free from highly intrusive and invasive canine
searches outweighs a school administration's special need to perform this
type of warrantless search.
Although Vernonia set a dangerous precedent by finding suspicionless drug searches of all student athletes to be reasonable, Massachusetts is not compelled to extend this decision to close proximity dog-sniff
searches. The Mass. SJC has firmly established that students maintain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their lockers. To protect a student's
material belongings, yet fail to extend the same protections to that student's
actual body, would be entirely non sequitur.
Finally, the Mass. SJC should determine that the privacy protections guaranteed to students by Article Fourteen extend beyond those afforded by the Fourth Amendment. To do so, the Mass. SJC must protect
Massachusetts' students from unreasonable searches that would not pass
133 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing factual differences between Horton
and Kelly).
134 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (considering differing analyses of Horton and
Kelly courts).
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Fourth Amendment muster outside the schoolhouse gates. Massachusetts
has a duty to protect its vulnerable students from offensive, close proximity
dog-sniff searches that would impede on any individual's sense of personal
dignity. Consequently, Massachusetts, while recognizing the dire need to
maintain a safe scholastic environment, must continue to protect the inherent privacy of its students.
Suzanne Stewart

